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ABSTRACT
The increasing amount of personal data is raising serious issues
in the context of privacy, security, and data ownership. Entities
whose data are being collected can benefit from mechanisms to
manage the parties that can access their data and to audit who has
accessed their data. Consent management systems address these
issues. We present Consentio, a scalable consent management
system based on the Hyperledger Fabric permissioned blockchain.
The data management challenge we address is to ensure high
throughput and low latency of endorsing data access requests and
granting or revoking consent. Experimental results show that our
system can handle as many as 6,000 access requests per second,
allowing it to scale to very large deployments.
1 INTRODUCTION
Data volumes have been growing exponentially: there are now
3.7 billion individuals with access to the Internet, generating 2.5
quintillion bytes of data every day1. The increasing amount of
data being collected and analyzed, especially personal data, is
raising serious issues in the context of privacy, security, and data
ownership. These issues have been recognized, for example, by
the recent EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), which
requires organizations consuming private data to obtain consent
from the individuals whose data are being collected.
We illustrate the broad need for consent in accessing private
data by considering three different contexts. First, in the area of
healthcare, personal health data such as medical histories, vital
signs, and lab test results are collected by hospitals, wearables,
health-tracking applications, and assisted living systems. The data
may be shared with various healthcare professionals to provide
care or to participate in research studies [35]. However, these
entities should only be able to view personal data with a patient’s
explicit consent. Second, a great deal of personal data are collected
by online and mobile apps, and often shared with third parties: e.g.,
emails, web browsing and search histories, location data. Recent
developments such as the Cambridge Analytica scandal [23] show
that users have little control over how their online data are used
or shared. A data-access process that includes user consent could
have averted or at least minimized this privacy breach. Finally,
smart cities are collecting potentially sensitive data through street
1https://www.forbes.com/sites/bernardmarr/2018/05/21/how-much-data-do-we-
create-every-day-the-mind-blowing-stats-everyone-should-read
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cameras and smart electricity meters. For example, smart meter
data are sent to utility companies for billing, but individuals may
want to share their smart meter data with analytics services to help
reduce their bills, motivating energy data sharing platforms such
as Green Button2. Without a consent management mechanism,
users may not be willing to upload their data to such platforms.
In these applications, individuals whose data are being col-
lected should be able to decide who can access their personal data
and audit who has accessed their personal data. Ideally, consent
management systems (CMSs) should provide this functionality.
Recent work suggests that blockchains are ideal for managing
consent in a decentralized and verifiable manner [12, 15, 39, 40].
A blockchain is a distributed and tamper-proof transaction log
that is agreed on and replicated among the participating entities,
which do not necessarily trust each other. Since the introduction of
Bitcoin in 2007 [28], blockchain technologies have grown beyond
cryptocurrencies into distributed ledgers that record financial con-
tracts and track the provenance of assets [20], among many other
applications. In consent management, a blockchain transaction
corresponds to an individual’s granting or withdrawing of consent
to share data with a particular third party, or a third party’s re-
quest to obtain access to private data. Individuals may thus submit
transactions to specify who can access their data and can audit the
blockchain to find out who was granted access to their data.
While the idea to use a blockchain for consent management is
not new, most prior work in this area is not only domain-specific
but also lacks implementation details. As a result, it remains un-
clear if a blockchain can be the basis for a scalable CMS. To fill
this gap, we make the following contributions.
(1) CMS design: We present Consentio, a general and scal-
able CMS with a blockchain back end, mapping consent
operations to blockchain transactions.
(2) CMS implementation: We implement Consentio using
Hyperledger Fabric [2], a state-of-the-art permissioned
blockchain3. Our solution is implemented in Hyper-
ledger Fabric using smart contracts, which are essentially
blockchain versions of stored procedures.
(3) CMS world state design: To speed up transaction process-
ing and increase transaction throughput, Fabric maintains a
world state key-value store. The world state is essentially a
materialized view corresponding to the current state of the
2http://www.greenbuttondata.org/
3In a permissioned blockchain, the identities of the participating nodes are known to
everyone in the network, in contrast to permissionless networks such as Bitcoin that
allow anyone to join anonymously. Permissioned blockchains delegate transaction
serialization and validation to a selected group of nodes, in contrast to, e.g., Bitcoin’s
Proof of Work, in which the first node that solves a cryptographic puzzle appends the
next block to the chain.
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entities whose transactions are stored on the blockchain. It
is not obvious what world state should mean in the context
of consent management. We address this data management
challenge by (a) examining the space of possible key-value
world state designs for consent management and (b) propos-
ing a design that ensures high throughput and low latency
of endorsing and revoking consent. Experimental results
using a Fabric cluster show that Consentio can handle as
many as 6,000 access requests/s and scales well with the
number of nodes used to endorse transactions.
We believe that a novel aspect of our solution over prior work is
that it “does more with less.” Specifically, Hyperledger Fabric uses
a simple key-value store to store world state, rather than relational
database system that supports SQL. Yet, we demonstrate that an
efficient and scalable CMS can be built using Fabric.
Note that like any other CMS, Consentio only manages users’
permission settings for data access and endorses third-party re-
quests to access private data (details of CMS goals and func-
tionality are in Section 2). Thus, when it approves a request to
access data, it effectively gives the requesting entity a key to ob-
tain the data from some data store (and maintains a record of
this transaction). Managing these data stores in a trusted fashion
is an orthogonal problem that we do not address. Furthermore,
after obtaining the desired data, the requesting entity is trusted
not to share the data with unauthorized parties. Again, we do not
address this problem, though we note that it can be resolved using
well-known mechanisms such as data watermarking [30].
The structure of this paper is as follows. We introduce CMS
functionality and use cases in Section 2. In Section 3, we present
the high-level design of Consentio and justify the use of a per-
missioned blockchain. We then discuss implementation and opti-
mization details in Hyperledger Fabric in Section 4. We present
experimental results in Section 5, and discuss related work in Sec-
tion 6. We conclude with directions for future work in Section 7.
2 CONSENT MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS:
DEFINITIONS AND GOALS
In this section, we discuss the participating entities, functionality,
and example use cases of a Consent Management System (CMS).
We begin by defining consent concepts and entities, using standard
terminology from the consent management and role-based access
control literature [4, 32].
• An Individual, also referred to as a Data Subject, is a
person whose data are being collected.
• A Resource is a subset of an individual’s data of the same
type, e.g., a time series of blood pressure measurements, or
demographic information such as date of birth or gender.
• A Data Generator is an entity that produces data, e.g., a
hospital or a smart meter system, and stores this data in a
Data Store.
• A Data Consumer, also referred to as a Data Processor, is
an entity that may request access to private data (from the
data store) to perform Data Analysis.
• Data consumers are grouped into Roles; a given data con-
sumer may be assigned multiple roles. For example, a doc-
tor at hospital X may be assigned the roles of “Cancer
researcher” and/or “Hospital X staff”.
• A Watchdog assigs roles to data consumers. For example,
if a doctor wishes to be given a role of “Cancer researcher”,
he or she must contact an appropriate watchdog (e.g., a
research ethics board) for approval.
• Consent is expressed by a set of rules that specify which
role(s) may access an individual’s resources.
Next, we describe the required CMS functionality, drawing
again from the relevant consent management literature. Note that
here the CMS acts as the Data Controller.
(1) Individuals should be able to grant or withdraw consent to
data consumers acting in particular roles. Consent specifica-
tion should be fine-grained: it may depend on the resource,
the role, or the time range of the data (see, e.g., [12, 15, 40]).
In practice, some individuals, such as infants, may not be
able to give consent, motivating the need to be able to
delegate consent to another individual.
(2) Watchdogs should be able to assign and revoke data con-
sumers’ roles.
(3) Given their roles, data consumers should be able to request
permission to access data (see, e.g., [21, 40]). The CMS
must determine whether such permission can be granted.
(4) A CMS must be tamper-proof and auditable. Individuals
should be able to audit who requested (and was granted)
access to their data (see, e.g., [22, 40]). Data consumers
should be able to audit the CMS if asked to prove that they
have obtained clearance to access data.
Table 1 lists the entities participating in consent management
in three examples: electronic health records, smart infrastructure,
and social media. We describe these applications below.
• Electronic Health Records: Here, patients correspond to
individuals. Hospitals and healthcare research organiza-
tions generate data using medical equipment (serving as
data generators) and store the data in a hospital database
(serving as a data store). Doctors and other healthcare staff
may be the data consumers; they may require access to
personal data for treatment or to carry out research studies.
Roles may be assigned to consumers based on their affili-
ations or occupations. Watchdogs such as research ethics
boards may approve or deny roles such as those required to
do medical research. Patients may audit the CMS to deter-
mine who requested access to their data, while doctors and
medical researchers may use the CMS to prove that they
requested and obtained permission to access the data.
• Smart Infrastructure: With the growth of IoT technolo-
gies, governments are setting up smart infrastructure in
urban areas. Citizens use public infrastructure, and thus
should know if any third party has been given access to
their data, and, if possible, should control access to the data.
For instance, utility companies, as data consumers in their
role as electricity providers, may receive smart meter data
for billing. Homeowners may want to share smart meter
data with third parties or academic researchers to help re-
duce their bills. These third parties may be verified by civil
society organizations before being granted a role of, e.g.,
an energy data analyst. Individuals may then audit the CMS
to determine who accessed their data and third parties may
query the CMS to produce proof that they obtained consent
to access the data.
• Social Media: Social media applications collect social in-
teraction and behavioural data about their users. They may
sell the data to third parties or use the data to serve adver-
tisements. Users should be able to see who accessed their
data and manage their consent settings. Individuals are the
people using social media applications, and the data may
be stored on social media company databases. Company
Table 1: Participating entities in three consent management use cases.
Terminology E-Health Records Smart Infrastructure Social Media Applications
Individuals Patients/Study participants Citizens Social media users
Resource Types of medical/demographic data Smart meter data Social media content
Data Consumer Doctors/Researchers City planners/Researchers Social media companies/Researchers
Role Members of organizations Members of organizations Members of organizations
Data Generators Medical equipment IoT devices/Smart meters Social media apps
Data Stores Hospital databases Government databases Company databases
Watchdog Research ethics boards Civil society organizations Privacy advocates
analysts and third parties act as data consumers, and they
should only be able to access data after receiving consent
from users through the CMS. Privacy advocates serve as
watchdogs here.
3 BLOCKCHAINS FOR CONSENT
MANAGEMENT
In this section, we justify the use of a permissioned blockchain
for consent management. We also give a high-level overview of
Consentio’s design, scope and limitations (implementation details
follow in Section 4).
3.1 Mitigating Trust Issues in Consent
Management Systems
First, assume a centralized architecture for private data manage-
ment, in which the CMS, the data generators and the data store are
controlled by the same centralized entity. Figure 1 illustrates such
an architecture along with interactions between the participating
entities, with solid arrows representing requests made to the CMS
and dotted arrows representing the CMS response. In this design,
individuals, roles and watchdogs all rely on the controlling entity
to give or revoke consent, assign and revoke roles, request access
to data, and audit data request histories. As a result, the following
trust relationships exist:
(1) Individuals must trust the CMS to keep track of their con-
sent settings, and to only allow authorized roles to obtain
access to private data.
(2) Individuals must trust the watchdogs to assign and revoke
roles to data consumers.
(3) Data consumers (assigned particular roles) must trust the
CMS to correctly allow or deny access to data.
(4) Watchdogs must trust the CMS to assign and revoke data
consumers’ roles as requested.
(5) Data generators must be trusted to produce correct data.
(6) The data store must be trusted to release data only to con-
sumers that were approved by the CMS.
(7) Furthermore, individuals must trust the CMS not to collude
with data consumers to endorse data access without the
individuals’ consent.
(8) Similarly, watchdogs must trust the CMS not to collude
with data consumers to endorse data access to unauthorized
roles.
(9) Finally, data consumers must be trusted not to share any
data they obtained with unauthorized parties, and to use the
data only for approved purposes.
Blockchain systems are suitable for applications wishing to
eliminate a central trusted party [18], as is the case in the archi-
tecture illustrated in Figure 1. At a high level, a blockchain is
a distributed, immutable and tamper-proof transaction log main-
tained by a network of nodes. Instead of employing a trusted third
party to manage the transactions, the blockchain network is re-
sponsible for this. To do so, each node in a blockchain system
maintains a copy of the log, and a consensus protocol is used to
make progress and agree on the state of the log.
In a permissionless blockchain system such as Bitcoin, the
network is public and anyone can join anonymously, making
consensus difficult. Expensive methods such as Proof of Work
are used to decide on the next block of transactions, which are
then validated (e.g., to ensure there is no double-spending) by
all the participating nodes. In proof of work, each node may in-
dependently validate incoming transactions and place them into
an ordered block. Nodes then compete to solve a cryptographic
puzzle that requires substantial computing resources. These com-
peting nodes are referred to as miners. The first miner that solves
the puzzle wins the right to append its proposed next block to the
chain, as well as a reward in bitcoin. The winner sends a copy of
its block to the other nodes, which again validate the transactions,
and sequentially execute and commit them to update their copy of
the blockchain.
On the other hand, permissioned blockchain systems are usu-
ally jointly owned by a consortium of known participants who may
not necessarily trust each other. Here, nodes are not anonymous,
and each node must be approved to join the network by a member-
ship service run by the consortium. Thus, if any actor is found to
engage in malicious activities, the membership service can take
appropriate action. Instead of using proof of work, permissioned
systems delegate consensus to a subset (or to all) of the participat-
ing nodes that run a byzantine or crash fault tolerant consensus
protocol to decide on the next block of transactions. Permissioned
systems have been used in a wide range of applications requiring
a tamper-proof transaction log, and are usually not backed by a
native cryptocurrency.
Permissioned and permissionless systems ensure immutability
and tamper resistance via full replication and hash pointers to the
previous block stored in the next block (any attempted changes to
the blockchain after a new block has been committed invalidate
the pointers).
Following recent related work on consent management, we
observe that blockchains can mitigate some of the trust issues
identified earlier due to the presence of a centralized third party
that runs the CMS. Furthermore, as also observed in previous
work (details in Section 6), we choose a permissioned blockchain
in order to control membership (i.e., to only allow patients, doc-
tors and approved third-party data consumers). Additionally, for
auditability, the identities of data consumers must be known.
A critical design element in our solution is to decouple con-
sent management from data management, akin to decoupling the
control plane from the data plane in computer networks. Figure 2
Figure 1: A centralized consent management system
Figure 2: Consent management using Consentio.
places Consentio in this decoupled environment. We define the
consent layer, which is the focus of this paper, to include CMS
functionality such as granting or withdrawing consent to personal
data. In contrast, the data layer includes the data themselves. As
shown in the figure, consent is now jointly managed by all parties
using Consentio with a blockchain back end, without having to be
entrusted to a third party. Individuals can submit transactions to
give or withdraw consent for a given role to access a given data
resource. Data consumers can request role approval from watch-
dogs, who can submit the corresponding transactions (to grant or
revoke a role for a given consumer). Furthermore, data consumers
acting under some role may submit transactions to request access
to data. If permission is granted, data consumers may take their
proof of consent to the data store to obtain the data (the details of
obtaining the data given a proof of consent are orthogonal to this
paper and not discussed further). All of these transactions are on
the blockchain and therefore are tamper-proof and auditable by
all parties.
Given the design in Figure 2, the following trust issues have
been mitigated.
• The CMS cannot collude with data consumers to endorse
unauthorized data access. Any requests for data access (if
granted) will be on the blockchain, are thus tamper-proof,
and may be audited.
• The CMS cannot deny data access to consumers who ought
to have access. Again, individuals’ consent settings will be
on the blockchain, are tamper-proof, and may be verified.
• The CMS cannot collude with data consumers to ignore
the roles assigned by watchdogs. All role assignments and
revocations will be on the blockchain, are tamper-proof,
and may be audited.
These situations correspond to trust issues 1, 3, 4, 7 and 8
defined earlier.
(Note that similar trust issues exist in current banking sys-
tems: customers must trust the banks to record their transactions
properly. On the other hand, in a network such as Bitcoin, the
blockchain may be audited to prove that a transaction took place.)
3.2 Limitations
A limitation of the general design shown in Figure 2 is that trust
issues 2, 5, 6 and 9 remain. That is, data generators must still
be trusted to produce correct data; the data store must still be
trusted to release data only to consumers that obtained the nec-
essary permission from the CMS; data consumers must still be
trusted to not “leak” the data; and watchdogs must still be trusted
to assign and revoke roles (e.g., to revoke a “data analyst” role
from an analyst who is found to share the data with unauthorized
parties). Of these four issues, only the watchdog issue is at the
consent layer. However, by definition, watchdogs are usually pub-
lic organizations, governments or consortia, and therefore have
some built-in transparency and can be held accountable by the
public. On the other hand, the trust relationships with data gen-
erators, data stores and data consumers are at the data layer and
therefore outside the scope of this paper (however, we will point
out potential solutions to data-layer trust problems in Section 6).
In particular, we acknowledge that consent management will not
solve data layer issues, but instead sets up a a mechanism to verify
whether consent was given. This makes the auditing process faster
and cheaper as a watchdog no longer needs to wait or obtain the
necessary permits to audit the data.
4 IMPLEMENTING CONSENTIO IN
HYPERLEDGER FABRIC
In this section, we discuss the implementation of Consentio using
the Hyperledger Fabric [2] permissioned blockchain system. Our
CMS design generalizes those presented in recent work on health-
care and IoT consent management (see, e.g., [3, 31, 39]). We start
with an overview of Fabric, followed by an exploration of possible
world state designs for consent management, and implementation
details of Consentio.
4.1 Overview of Hyperledger Fabric
Hyperledger Fabric [2] is an open-source collaborative project
hosted by the Linux Foundation and maintained by IBM. It is
a popular and an actively studied permissioned blockchain sys-
tem [1, 19, 33, 36]. From a data management standpoint, there
are two important data structures: the blockchain, which is the
transaction log, and the world state, which is a key-value store
to maintain some application-defined state information. For con-
currency control, the key-value store is versioned, and each key
includes a version number of its latest value. Furthermore, from a
transaction processing standpoint, there are two important stages:
transaction ordering and transaction execution.
The nodes in a Fabric cluster are divided into orderers, responsi-
ble only for transaction ordering, and peers, each peer maintaining
a copy of the blockchain and the world state. Some peers are also
endorsers, which are additionally responsible for endorsing client
transactions.
Figure 3 illustrates the transaction pipeline in Fabric. On the
top left, a client begins by sending its transaction to the endorsers
(the figure assumes there are three endorsing peers). Each endorser
simulates the execution of the transaction (expressed in chaincode,
which is Fabric’s term for a smart contract) in a sandboxed envi-
ronment, and records the versions of all keys that were read or
written. This read-write set is appended to the transaction, along
with the endorser’s signature, and returned to the client.
After a client collects the endorsements, it sends its transaction
along with the endorsements to the orderer peers. Orderers run
some consensus protocol and agree on the order of transactions,
which are then segmented into blocks. Next, blocks are sent to all
the peers for validation and commitment. Each peer serially exe-
cutes the transactions and updates its world state, incrementing the
version numbers of updated keys. A transaction commits if every
key in its read-write set (as computed earlier by the endorsers) still
has the same version number. Otherwise, this means that a prior
transaction has written a new value to a key touched by the current
transaction, and the current transaction aborts. Finally, each peer
appends the new block to its copy of the blockchain. Note that
blocks may include aborted transactions, which are labelled as
such.
For example, suppose the entity with key A submits two trans-
actions: transfer some amount of money from A to entity B, and
transfer some amount from A to entity C. The smart contract for
such a transaction may check if the sender has sufficient balance
to make the transfer, and, if so, update the sender and receiver
balances accordingly. Suppose the version numbers of all the keys
are currently 100. The read-write set of the first transaction, as
computed by the endorsers, is then {A:100, B:100}, indicating
the keys and their version numbers. Similarly, the read-write set
of the second transaction is {A:100, C:100}. Note that the version
number of A is the same for both transactions because they were
initially executed in a sandboxed environment by the endorsers,
and therefore the writes are not yet committed to the world state.
Now suppose the first transaction is ordered before the second one
by the ordering service. This means that only the first transaction
can be committed in the current block and the second one will
abort to prevent potential double-spending: since the second trans-
action was executed in a sandbox without seeing the effects of the
first one, it is not clear if A now has enough money left for the
transfer to C. To understand why, observe that the first transaction
will write a new value to key A, incrementing its version to 101.
When the second transaction is executed by the peers, the current
version number of A (101) will not match the version number
of A in the second transaction’s read-write set computed by the
endorsers (100). In this example, the client would have to resub-
mit the second transaction, which would be re-endorsed with the
read-write set of {A:101, C:100}. The second transaction may
then be committed in the next block, provided that the version
numbers of A and C are not incremented by other transactions
included in the next block.
4.2 Consentio Transactions
In the remainder of this section, we discuss the implementation
details of Consentio in Fabric. First, we explain the transactions.
Recall from Section 2 that a CMS deals with individuals (identi-
fied by ind_id) and their resources (identified by res_id), data con-
sumers (identified by dc_id) and their roles (identified by role_id),
as well as watchdogs (identified by wd_id). To allow fine-grained
consent specification, resources are divided into timeframes, with
a time unit identified by time_id.
Recall from Section 2 that there are four required CMS func-
tionalities, reiterated below with references to the identifiers of
the participating entities.
(1) Consent: An individual (with a given ind_id) may grant or
withdraw consent to allow data consumers (with a particu-
lar role_id granted by a particular wd_id) to access a frag-
ment of a resource res_id corresponding to time time_id.
To enable fine-grained consent specification, we allow indi-
viduals to only allow data access for specific roles approved
by specific watchdogs, and to only allow access to selected
temporal fragments of the data. While consent can be dele-
gated, we do not record delegation as a transaction on the
blockchain due to privacy and legal implications. Instead,
we offload delegation to the membership service, which is
trusted. Alternatively, we can improve security by using
a solution similar to ControlChain [29], which employs a
separate blockhain for delegations. In the remainder of this
paper, we assume for simplicity that if individual x controls
Figure 3: Transaction flow in Hyperledger Fabric (adapted from [2])
the consent settings of individual y through delegation, then
individual x would interact with Consentio as individual y.
(2) Role: A watchdog with a particular wd_id may grant or
revoke role role_id for data consumer dc_id.
(3) Access Request: A data consumer with a role role_id
granted by watchdog wd_id may request access to a frag-
ment of resource res_id corresponding to time time_id.
The CMS (specifically, Fabric endorsers) must identify the
ind_ids of individuals who have have allowed role role_id
granted by wd_id to have access to the requested fragment
of the requested resource. A record of an access request
transaction will be written to the blockchain, together with
the list of the consenting individual IDs. Note that we do
not allow consumers to directly request access to a particu-
lar individual’s data.
(4) Audit: The above transactions must be tamper-proof and
auditable. Individuals should be able to audit their con-
sent histories and requests to access their data; consumers
should be able to audit their access requests; and watchdogs
should be able to audit their role approvals and withdrawals.
In Fabric, transactions are implemented as smart contracts and
are recorded in the blockchain. Since Fabric is a permissioned
system, all participating individuals, data consumers and watch-
dogs must be approved by a membership service. In our setting,
endorser and peer nodes may be managed by a consortium of
watchdogs.
Since each Fabric peer maintains a copy of the blockchain
storing the transactions, we envision an off-chain data analytics
layer supported by the peers that allows participating parties to
audit their transactions. This may be implemented in a tool such
as Hyperledger Explorer [11]. We can also offload consent delega-
tion to the membership service, which is responsible for assigning
public-private key pairs to all peers. Note that only the participat-
ing peers have a copy of the blockchain, not the clients, meaning
that clients do not have access to other clients’ consent policies on
the blockchain. Instead, individuals can submit audit requests to
the endorser(s), who in turn can check which data consumers were
given access to the individual’s data. Furthermore, individuals can
contact several random endorsers to audit the data.
4.3 Space of World State Designs
The key-value world state is a critical data structure maintained
by Fabric to process transactions. In simple financial applications,
the world state is straightforward: the key is an account ID and the
value is the current balance in that account. Smart contracts that
move funds from one account to another must verify that there is
enough money in the sender’s account, subtract funds from the
sender’s account, and add funds to the recipient’s account. This can
be done by reading from and writing to the world state, followed
by appending the corresponding transaction to the blockchain; it
is not necessary to scan the blockchain (which may be very long)
in order to commit a transaction.
In the design of Consentio, the data management challenge is
to translate the complex requirements on CMS transactions into a
simple key-value world state. We want to ensure high transaction
throughput to scale to very large deployments: many individuals,
many resources divided into many time units, many data con-
sumers, etc. Additionally, we also want to ensure low latency
given Fabric’s double-spending prevention that aborts transactions
attempting to write to a key that has already been written to by
another transaction in the same block. If there are many such
conflicting transactions, they must be re-issued in the next block,
meaning that it may take many blocks until all such transactions
are committed.
To explore the space of world state designs, we observe that the
three main entities in consent management are individuals, data
(resources), and data consumers (roles); watchdogs also partic-
ipate in a CMS but there are likely to be fewer watchdogs than
individuals and consumers. This suggests three designs, explained
below and illustrated in key-value format in Listing 1.
• Role-oriented world state (RoWS) groups similar roles
together. A key is a concatenation of resource ID, individual
ID, watchdog ID and time ID, and a value is a list of role
IDs that were given access to the data specified in the
key (i.e., the given time fragment of the given resource
of the given individual) and were approved by the given
watchdog.
• Resource-oriented world state (RWS) groups similar re-
sources together. This design was initially suggested in [13].
A key is a concatenation of individual ID, role ID, watch-
dog ID and time ID, and a value is a list of resource IDs
for which consent was given as specified in the key (i.e.,
the given individual has given consent for the particular
temporal fragments of the resources to be accessed by the
given roles approved by the given watchdogs).
• Individual-oriented world state (IWS) groups similar in-
dividuals together. A key is a concatenation of resource
ID, role ID, watchdog ID and time ID, and a value is a list
of individual IDs giving consent to the data specified in
the key (i.e., the given temporal fragment of a the given
resource being available to the given role approved by the
given watchdog).
1 RoWS
2 {res_id|ind_id|wd_id|time_id:
3 [role_id_1,..., role_id_n]
4 }
5 --------------------------------------
6 RWS
7 {ind_id|wd_id|role_id|time_id:
8 [res_id_1,..., res_id_n]
9 }
10 --------------------------------------
11 IWS
12 {res_id|wd_id|role_id|time_id:
13 [ind_id_1,..., ind_id_n]
14 }
Listing 1: World state designs in key:value format
Independently of these three designs, the world state also needs
to record role information. Listing 2 shows the world state for
role assignments and revocations: a key is a triple (role_id, dc_id,
wd_id), and the value indicates whether a role was granted or
withdrawn. When processing access request transactions, this
will allow us to quickly determine if a given data consumer was
assigned a given role by a given watchdog.
1 {role_id|dc_id|wd_id:'assign'}
Listing 2: Watchdog assigning a role to a data consumer
4.4 Example
Figure 4 illustrates the differences between RWS, RoWS and IWS
in terms of transaction processing. The blue boxes show the trans-
actions and their parameters, and the white boxes show the key-
value world state for each design (we omit key version numbers
for simplicity). We consider two resources, HR and BP; 3 individ-
uals with IDs 1,2 and 3; one role, R1; one data consumer, DC1;
one watchdog, W1; and one timeframe, 2017. There are eight
transactions executed sequentially. Suppose transactions 1-6 are in
different blocks and transaction 7a and 7b are in the same block.
The first three transactions correspond to each of the three
individuals giving consent for role R1 approved by watchdog W1
to access the resources HR and BP. In RoWS and RWS, each
transaction creates new records in the world state. In IWS, these
transactions modify the values of existing keys. Additionally, each
transaction (and its input paramters) is recorded on the blockchain.
Note the different number of keys and values in the different
world state designs after transaction 3 commits. There are six keys
with one value each in RoWS because consent was given to one
role for six different resource-individual-timeframe combinations
Table 2: Computational complexity of transactions for each
world state design (n=the number of individuals)
Functionality RoWS RWS IWS
Assign/Revoke Role O (1) O (1) O (1)
Grant/Revoke Consent O (1) O (1) O (1)
Access Request O (n) O (n) O (1)
There are three keys with two values each in RWS because con-
sent to two resources was given by three different individuals.
There are two keys and three values each in IWS because three
individuals gave consent to two different resource-role-timeframe
combinations.
Transaction 4 is a request for access made by data consumer
DC1 claiming to have role R1 assigned by watchdog W1. However,
this role has not yet been assigned to DC1 by the watchdog. As a
result, Consentio would not grant access to the data.
In transaction 5, watchdog W1 assigns role R1 to DC1, result-
ing in an update of the world state shown in grey (and an insertion
of this transaction and its parameters into the blockchain). When
consumer DC1 requests access again (transaction 6), its request
is now granted by Consentio. In RoWS, all the keys containing
watchdog W1, timeframe 2017, and resource BP need to be iden-
tified; then, if the corresponding value includes R1, then we know
that the corresponding individual granted R1 consent for the re-
quested data item. The process then repeats for resource HR. In
RWS, we similarly need to find keys containing W1, R1 and 2017,
and whose value includes the requested resources, BP or HR. In
IWS, we access one key (if it exists) per resource-timeframe pair:
the one with BP, W1, R1 and 2017, and the one with HR, W1, R1
and 2017. We then retrieve the corresponding value (i.e., the list
of individual IDs). Below transaction 6, the figure shows the lists
of individual IDs that will be included with the transaction on the
blockchain depending on the world state design.
Transaction 7a illustrates revocation of consent to one of the
two resources by individual 1. This results in the deletion of a
key in RoWS or the modification of the value of a key in both
RWS and IWS. Finally, in transaction 7b, another access request
is made. However, since transactions 7a and 7b are in the same
block, transaction 7b would be aborted since the keys it touched
during endorsement (before the effects of transaction 7a) overlap
with those touched by transaction 7a.
4.5 Complexity Analysis
In a real-life deployment of a CMS, there may be many individuals
and resources, and the resources may be broken up into many time
fragments to allow fine-grained consent (and to insist that data
consumers request access to each timeframe of each resource in-
dividually). As a result, Consentio needs to scale with the number
of transactions, which requires each transaction to be processed
efficiently. We now analyze the computational complexity of trans-
actions using different world state designs. We show a summary
in Table 2. In this section, we assume that an access request refers
to one particular timeframe of one particular resource.
First, the complexity of a watchdog’s assigning or revoking a
role is O(1) independently of the world state design. It suffices
to check if a key with the given watchdog id, data consumer id
and role id exists; we update its value if it exists and we create it
otherwise.
Using IWS, transactions to grant or revoke consent and transac-
tions requesting access both have constant-time complexity. If a
Figure 4: Transaction processing using different world state designs
data consumer (claiming a particular role assigned by a particular
watchdog) wants to access one resource for a single timeframe,
then we make two key lookups. The first is to determine if the role
claimed by the data consumer was assigned by the given watch-
dog. The second is to retrieve the value (i.e., the list of consenting
individual IDs) corresponding to the key with the requested re-
source and timeframe, the consumer’s role_id, and the watchdog
that assigned it. If an individual wants to grant or revoke consent
(for one individual, one resource, one timeframe and one role),
this requires one key lookup. The lookup is to find the key cor-
responding to the consent being modified (or create it if it does
not exist), and to update the value accordingly. We implement the
values (lists of individual IDs) as hashmaps, giving constant-time
complexity to add or remove individuals, assuming constant time
to serialize and deserialize a hashmap stored as a value in the
world state.
Using RWS and RoWS, granting or revoking consent has
constant-time complexity. One lookup is required to find the key
corresponding to the consent being granted or revoked, and update
the value (again, we implement the values as hashmaps, giving
constant-time update cost). However, requesting access in RWS
and RoWS has linear complexity with the number of individuals
since individual ID is part of their keys. For each individual in the
system, we can concatenate its individual ID with the parameters
contained in the request access transaction, and look up all the
corresponding keys. We then return the individual IDs where the
corresponding value contained the requesting consumer’s role
(RWS) or the requested resource (RoWS).
Algorithm 1 Assign/Revoke Role
Input: wd_id,dc_id, role_id,action
Output: None
1: procedure ASSIGN/REVOKE ROLE
2: key ← role_id |dc_id |wd_id
3: if action == ’assign’ then
4: PUT(key, ’assign’)
5: else
6: DELETE(key)
4.6 Consentio Smart Contracts
Informed by the complexity analysis, we select IWS for Con-
sentio. Furthermore, we expect the number of individuals in
a CMS to be higher than the number of resources (e.g., in a
healthcare setting, there may be hundreds of thousands of pa-
tients but perhaps hundreds of resources). Thus, the number of
keys in IWS is expected to be smaller than in the other two de-
signs. The smart contract source code is publicly available at
https://github.com/ddhruvkr/Consentio, and we discuss the smart
contract pseuducode below.
In the pseudocode, we use the following functions to interact
with the key-value world state.
GET(k): returns the value corresponding to key k
PUT(k,v): writes value v to key k and increments the version
number (or creates a new key with version number 1 if the key
does not exist).
DELETE(k): Deletes key k and its corresponding value.
Assign/Revoke Role: Algorithm 1 shows the pseudocode for
this smart contract. It takes a watchdog id (wd_id) data consumer
id (dc_id), role id (role_id) and an action (which can be ‘assign’
or ‘revoke’) as input. It first constructs the key using the watchdog
id, data consumer id and role id (Line 2). If the action is ‘assign’,
it creates an entry in the world state denoting an assignment of a
role (Line 3-4). Otherwise, it revokes the role assigned previously
by deleting the entry from the world state (Line 5-6).
Grant/Revoke Consent Algorithm 2 shows the pseudocode
for this smart contract, which allows a consent modification for
a set of resources. It first iterates over the set of resources given
in the input and assembles keys by concatenating the resource,
role, watchdog and the time-period (Line 2-3). It then fetches a
list of consenting individuals for each key (Line 4). If the key does
not exist and the action is Grant, it creates an entry for this key
and stores the individual id (Line 5-6). If an entry already exists
and if the action is Revoke, it updates the value by deleting the
individual id from the list (Line 7-9). If the action is Grant and
the individual id does not exist in the value, the individual id is
added (Line 10-11). Finally, the world state is updated with the
new value (Line 12).
The Request Access smart contract pseudocode is shown in
Algorithm 3. It allows a data consumer to specify a list of resources
it wants to access. For each requested resource, the smart contract
returns a list of consenting individuals. First, it checks whether
the data consumer was assigned a role by the specified watchdog
to access the requested resources (Line 2-4). For each resource
in the input (Line 6), a key is generated with the concatenation
of resource, watchdog, role, and time (Line 7). Next, a list of
consenting individual ids is returned (Line 8) and, if not empty,
added to the output (Line 9-10). Finally, the lists of consenting
individual IDs for each requested resource are returned (Line 13).
Algorithm 2 Grant/Revoke Consent
Input: ind_id, role_id, wd_id, time_id, resourceList, action
1: procedure GRANT/REVOKE CONSENT
2: for resource ∈ resourceList do
3: key ← resource |wd_id |role_id |time_id
4: idList ← GET(key)
5: if idList == ∅ and( action == ’Grant’) then
6: idList ← [ind_id ]
7: if idList , ∅ then
8: if ind_id ∈ idList and action == ’Revoke’ then
9: idList ← idList − ind_id
10: if ind_id < idList and action == ’Grant’ then
11: idList ← idList ∪ ind_id
12: PUT(key, idList)
Algorithm 3 Request Access
Input: dc_id,role_id,wd_id,resourceList,time_id
Output: {key : [ind_id_1, . .. ,ind_id_n]}
1: procedure REQUEST ACCESS
2: key ← role_id |dc_id |wd_id
3: if GET(key) == ∅ then
4: return NULL
5: result ← {}
6: for resource ∈ ResourceList do
7: key ← resource |wd_id |role_id |time_id
8: idList ← GET(key)
9: if idList < ∅ then
10: result[key] = idList
11: if r esult == ∅ then
12: return NULL
13: return result
4.7 Latency Implications
Due to Fabric’s double spending prevention, transactions access-
ing the same key (with at least one transaction writing a new value)
are said to conflict, and only one of them can be committed in
a single block. This increases latency since the conflicting trans-
actions must be re-issued and re-endorsed in subsequent blocks.
If there are k conflicting transactions in one block, it will take
k blocks to commit all of them, one per block. Since our three
world state designs have different keys, they also induce different
transaction collisions.
In RoWS and RWS, request access transactions are likely to
conflict with consent modification transaction because the former
are likely to touch many keys, perhaps including the keys being
modified by the latter. This is not the case in IWS, where an access
request transaction touches only one key. As long as that key is
not being modified by another transaction, there is no conflict.
Furthermore, regardless of the world state design, access request
transactions never conflict with each other because they do not
write to the world state (more precisely, they do not modify the
version number of any key), only the to blockchain.
However, consent management transactions for different indi-
viduals may conflict with each other only in IWS (because in the
other two designs, individual ID is part of the key). As a conse-
quence, multiple individuals cannot add or revoke consent for the
same resource, same timeframe, same role and same watchdog
in a single block. This may be a problem if multiple individuals
wish to revoke consent for a misbehaving role as soon as possible.
However, since roles are approved and withdrawn by watchdogs,
it may make more sense for watchdogs to handle such cases. Re-
gardless of the world state design, watchdog transactions do not
conflict with any other transactions since they use a separate key
space. Thus, watchdogs can immediately revoke a role, and the
end result is the same as if all the individuals had revoked all of
their consent for that role, one resource-timeframe pair at a time.
5 EXPERIMENTS
In this section, we experimentally evaluate Consentio through
micro-benchmarking and a comparison of the IWS world state
design to RWS (we omit results using RoWS, which, despite the
same worst-case complexity as RWS, was less efficient due to its
larger key space if there are fewer roles than resources). For the
Fabric cluster, we use five local servers connected by a 1 Gbit/s
switch. Each server is equipped with two Intel Xeon CPU E5-
2620 v2 processors at 2.10 GHz, and 64 GB of RAM. We use a
single endorser, orderer, peer, and four clients. We use GO to im-
plement smart contracts and use FastFabric [19] as the underlying
permissioned blockchain (FastFabric is a recent modification of
Fabric that improves transaction throughput without changing the
fundamental architecture or the API).
The experiments focus on transaction throughput. We gener-
ate non-conflicting transactions that proceed through the entire
transaction pipeline without being aborted. Thus, we evaluate the
maximum capacity of the pipeline, keeping in mind that conflict-
ing transactions reduce throughput and increase latency.
We do not measure endorsement time since our focus in this
paper is on speeding up transaction commitment through a suit-
able world state design. Additionally, we can easily scale out
the endorsers for higher endorsement throughput. Thus, we send
pre-endorsed transactions to the orderer, which groups them into
blocks and sends the blocks to the committer. The committer vali-
dates and commits changes to its world state, and sends validated
blocks to the endorsers. We set up 25 threads within each client
(totalling 100 threads) that send transactions to the orderer and
monitor the time it takes to send 100,000 transactions. Follow-
ing prior work that has done a detailed micro-benchmarking of
FastFabric [19], we set the block size to 100.
Recall from Section 4 that in our context, a data consumer’s
request to access a resource only reads from the world state: it
suffices to read the consent information captured in the world
state to decide whether to grant or reject the request. On the other
hand, when an individual modifies their consent settings (or when
watchdogs update roles), the world state is also modified.
5.1 Micro-Benchmarking of IWS World State
Effect of world state size: First, we vary the number of keys in
the world state from 20,000 to 1,000,000, and we set the value
size per key (i.e., the number of individual IDs) and keys touched
per transaction to 100. In this experiment, we only perform world
state reads (i.e., GET requests). Figure 5 shows the transaction
throughput. Next, as shown in Figure 6, we keep the keyspace
fixed at 20,000 and keys touched per transaction at 100, and we
increase the value space, i.e., the number of individual IDs per key,
from 1 to 10,000. Again, we only perform GET requests. Finally,
in Figure 7 we show how the write throughput (i.e., PUT requests)
of the world state changes by increasing the value space. We fix
keys touched per transaction at 100 and the key space at 20,000.
We conclude that as long as the world state fits in memory, which
is the case in these experiments, throughput is not significantly
affected by the number of keys or the value size per key.
Figure 5: Read throughput performance vs. size of key space
(the value space and keys touched per transaction are kept
constant at 100)
Figure 6: Read throughput performance vs. size of value
space (keys touched per transaction is kept constant at 100
and key space is kept constant at 20,000)
Figure 7: Write throughput performance vs. value size per
key (key touched per transaction are kept constant at 100 and
key space is kept constant at 20,000)
Effect of transaction size: Next, we experiment with read
transactions touching different numbers of keys: from 1 to 3,000.
Figure 8 shows the results; recall that we report committer through-
put, with endorsement time removed (i.e., pre-endorsed transac-
tion throughput), which helps us to zoom in on committer perfor-
mance. We observe that a single endorser cannot keep up when
each transaction touches close to 1000 keys (more keys per trans-
action means more accesses to the world state per transaction
during endorsement). At this point, to scale out the system, we
add another endorser. Having two endorsers allows us to keep up
with transactions touching up to 2500 keys. However, regardless
of the number of endorsers, throughput decreases as transaction
size increases since large transactions perform more accesses into
Figure 8: Read throughput (of pre-endorsed transactions) vs.
transaction size and the number of endorsers (value space =
100; key space = 20,000)
Table 3: Comparison of world state designs
RWS (as suggested in [13]) IWS (Consentio)
#R #I #Keys #Hits TPS #Keys #Hits TPS
200 200 200 201 2,239 200 2 6,559
200 20K 20K 20K overload 200 2 6,559
20K 200 200 201 2,239 20K 2 6,622
20K 20K 20K 20K overload 20K 2 6,622
TPS=Transactions Per Second; R Resources; I Individuals
#Hits - number of keys touched per transaction
Table 4: Review of blockchain-based CMSs
Papers Domain
Agnostic
Performance
Oriented
Implement-
abilty
[8, 21, 27, 40] ✓ ✗ ✗
[3, 5, 31, 39] ✗ ✗ ✓
[12, 16, 22, 25] ✗ ✗ ✗
[13, 37, 38] ✗ ✓ ✗
Consentio ✓ ✓ ✓
the world state during commitment (meaning that now, the com-
mitter becomes the bottleneck, not the endorsers). Furthermore,
for small transaction sizes, adding a second endorser does not
increase (and even slightly decreases) throughput. We believe that
the slight decrease is due to experimental noise as there is no
systematic problem with scaling out the endorsers.
5.2 IWS vs. RWS Design
We now compare the RWS world state design suggested in [13]
with the IWS world state design we use in Consentio. We con-
struct four workloads of access requests. We vary the number of
individuals and resources in the world state. Table 3 shows the
results, one row per workload (note that the number of keys and
keys touched per transaction in a given workload is different for
RWS and IWS). We conclude that Consentio has higher throughput
in all tested scenarios. The throughput of IWS remains constant
as the workload parameters vary, whereas RWS overloads when
the number of individuals is large. This is because requests to
access data in RWS correspond to complex transactions that touch
many keys, as explained in Section 4.5. Even when the number of
resources is large, IWS performs better than RWS.
6 RELATED WORK
Table 4 summarizes the previous work on blockchains for consent
management along the following three axes, and the remainder of
this section discusses the work in detail.
• Domain Agnostic: Is the system designed for a single
domain/application area or for multiple domains?
• Performance Oriented: Is the architecture optimized for
performance?
• Implementation Details (Replicability): Are there
enough details to implement the proposed solution?
We begin with prior work that used permissionless blockchains.
The authors of [27] manage and enforce access control policies
on a Bitcoin-like blockchain. The blockchain stores the IDs of
the participants who hold access rights and the set of associated
permissions. As with cryptocurrency, a user can transfer their ac-
cess rights to another user. However, they do not provide a smart
contract implementation to evaluate and enforce consent poli-
cies. Zyskind et al. [40] combine a permissionless blockchain, re-
purposed as an access control moderator, with an off-blockchain
storage solution for consent in mobile applications. Users are not
required to trust a third party and can find out who accessed their
data. However, implementation details were not discussed.
The authors in [31, 39], and [3] present consent management
systems, with some implementation details, for specific domains.
Zhang et al. [39] provide access control for subject-object pairs
in the Internet of Things (IoT). Access control contracts perform
static access right validation based on predefined policies and dy-
namic access right validation by checking the behaviour of the in-
dividual to whom access is given. They provide a proof-of-concept
implementation and implement smart contracts in Ethereum [7],
a permissionless Blockchain. Rantos et al. [31] provide a GDPR-
compliant, Ethereum based framework for managing data from
IoT devices. They propose an Intelligent Policy Access Mecha-
nism (IPAM) to analyze consent policies, detect inconsistencies,
and group similar policies together. Azaria et al. [3] give patients
access to their medical information across providers and treatment
sites. They use Ethereum to manage authentication, confidential-
ity, accountability and data sharing. They associate a medical
record with viewing permissions and data retrieval queries (in
SQL) for execution on external databases. However, they focus
on giving patients access to their medical histories rather than
general consent management. Boiani in [6] inspect fabric based
EHR consent management under emergency situations where a
part of the network may be down.
The authors in [16, 25], and [12] use permissioned blockchains
for consent management. The authors in [16] discuss a
Hyperledger-based CMS, but do not provide any design or imple-
mentation details. Liang et al. [25] propose to use Fabric channels
between individuals and requesters to share data. Again, they do
not provide any implementation details. The authors in [12] pro-
pose to use a consortium blockchain for consent management
and access control, with the blockchain serving as a repository
for access policies. However, their design does not consider the
granularity of data access, lacks implementation details, and only
consider Electronic Health Records.
Dubovitskaya et al. [13] design a system for the medical domain
and suggest having a national data store that collects patient data
on the cloud. A membership service defines the roles of the actors
(doctors and patients). Finally, Hyperledger Fabric executes smart
contracts requesting data access. However, they assume that only
doctors can access patient data, they do not discuss data granularity
to which access is granted, and they do not discuss smart contract
details. Furthermore, as discussed earlier, their proposed world
state design (RWS) has transaction throughput than our design.
In summary, as shown in Table 4, to the best of our knowl-
edge, Consentio is the only blockchain-based CMS that is domain-
agnostic, fully implemented, and demonstrated to perform well.
While we focus on the consent layer, we briefly discuss work on
mitigating trust issues in the data layer resulting from the distribu-
tion of private data. A recent personal data store (PDS) framework
called Open-PDS [10] includes a mechanism for returning com-
putations on the data instead of the raw data. There are efforts to
tackle the problem from a legislative standpoint [9]. From a secu-
rity perspective, researchers have developed data anonymization
methods such k-anonymity [34], and its extensions l-diversity [26]
and t-closeness [24], to protect personal information. Differential
Privacy [14], on the other hand, relies on perturbing the data or
adding noise before sharing the data. Finally, there has been some
work on encryption schemes that enable running computations
and queries over encrypted data [17].
7 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
We presented Consentio, a general consent management system
using a permissioned blockchain back end: Hyperledger Fab-
ric. Using a blockchain allowed us to eliminate the need for a
trusted third party to maintain consent settings and transactions.
We showed that our solution can be applied to a variety of use
cases (Section 2). An important feature of our solution is that it
does not require any modifications to Fabric. To preserve compati-
bility with Fabric, the main technical challenge we addressed was
to ensure high throughput and low latency of consent transactions
given Fabric’s key-value world state. We analyzed the space of
possible world state designs and showed that an efficient world
state for consent management can be implemented using Fabric’s
key-value store (Section 4). Finally, experimental results showed
that Consentio can handle as many as 6,000 access request per
second running on a modest Fabric cluster (Section 5).
In this paper, we focused on the world state design to process
consent transactions (i.e., from the Fabric endorser perspective).
An interesting direction for future work on Consentio is to develop
an efficient data analytics layer for auditing the blockchain.
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